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DISCUSSION OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN PROTECTION 
PRACTICE IN GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND 
COURTS* 
Mr. Said man: Design patents need to be prepared and prosecuted just 
as carefully as utility patents. You have a duty of disclosure in utility pat-
ents. Attorneys are very well accustomed to sitting down with inventors 
and going over the entire history of the invention with them. The facts have 
come out in the utility situation. Most attorneys would have taken those 
facts and turned them over to the U.S. PTO [United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office]. 
When it does not happen in a design situation, it is probably more due 
to the cavalier attitude that patent attorneys take when it comes to design pat-
ents. They are an afterthought. They are a stepchild. But if you pay atten-
tion to them, as I did in the Avia case, where we sat down and we did get that 
prior art. We submitted it. Then those kind of defenses do not work. 
Mr. Ansher: The Mickey Mouse telephone turned out to be a highly 
commercial phone that was designed, more or less, to coordinate with the 
theme parks at Disney World. They also have a copending utility patent 
issued on that phone. The utility patent has claims directed to the handset 
hanger which has some interesting electronic functions. We still attempt to 
provide patent protection to deserving designers. I . 
Ms. Schrader (responding to a question concerning the copyright sep-
arability test): I am aware, of course, that conceptual separability has been 
discussed in recent court cases. Obviously, I think this is because those who 
seek protection would attempt to make a showing that there is in fact some-
thing conceptually separable. It is easier to prove than physical separabil- • 
ity. What I am trying to say is that physical separability is more of a fact. 
Conceptual separability is more in the mind. The Copyright Office does 
not have any particular difficulty at this point with the standard of concep-
tual separability. For us the test is being able, in your mind, to separate the 
artistic features and the basic utilitarian shape. 
For most applied designs, especially modern furniture designs, there is 
no separation, in our opinion, between the basic utilitarian shape and the 
functional design. There is simply no separation, so we do not have any 
particular difficulty with conceptual separability. For us, conceptual sepa-
rability really means that the separability does in fact exist, but it cannot be 
maintained physically. That is, you cannot take the item apart easily and 
* This is an extract of a discussion on the conference session on industrial design protection 
practice in governmental agencies and courts. Each session of the conference was 
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1. The Mickey Mouse design and utility patents discussed herein are found infra at 485-95. 
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have ~ utilitarian object on the one hand and a free-standing work of art at 
the same time. 
Most of the cases that we decide are in fact conceptual separability 
cases. In most cases we find that there is not any conceptual separability 
because the artistry and the functional design merge. 
Ms. Schrader (responding to a question of whether placing a work in a 
museum affects the Copyright Office decision on registrability): Officially, 
if it is an article of utility that you are dealing with, then you apply the sepa-
rability test. The fact that the museum has decided, for other reasons, pre-
sumably for aesthetic reasons, that this is something of particular value and 
should be put on display, is not something that we [Copyright Office] would 
ordinarily take account of. Again, I should stress that we are talking only 
about articles of utility. If you happen to have a particular object that is not 
an article of utility, then the fact that a museum has recognized it as a paint-
ing or a sculpture or something like that has some significance. 
Ms. Schrader (responding to a question concerning the Brandir case, 
which involved a bike rack design): That was an extremely difficult ques-
tion, but that particular object was so simple, so symmetrical in appear-
ance, as it was presented to the Copyright Office. It always looked like a 
bicycle rack to us. Even if it had never been used as a bicycle rack, it would 
have been a difficult question. There is no doubt of that. Basically, you do 
not apply the separability test [if a work is not a useful article). Instead you 
apply a test of originality alone. You make a determination of whether 
there is sufficient creative expression: n the object, as a whole, to warrant 
registration. You know, generally, the opinions of experts, such as muse-
ums, that the object may be within the historic category of a work of art. 
The museum recognition might have significance. It is a very difficult 
question when you are getting down to such a minimal approach as was 
used in the bicycle rack. 
Ms. Schrader (responding to a question concerning the Copyright 
Office's reaction to modern art): I think modern art in this context means 
primarily the design style that has been filed at least since World War II, and 
really through much of this century. It really is distinguishing it from a his-
torical design style that might be more given to ornamentation. I was only 
suggesting that if you have ornamented objects, you generally do have some 
separable artistic features. I mean the obvious examples that have always 
been given are a lion's head carved on top of a chair, a piece of sculpture 
attached to the hood of an automobile. Obviously, a clearly victorian work 
applied to a refrigerator might also have been applied on canvas or on a 
piece of paper. Those are obvious examples of separable artistic features 
that have no relationship to the basic shape of the utilitarian object. whereas 
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I understand many, if not all modern designers, attempt to merge aesthetics 
and function. 
Unfortunately, I do not have pictures to illustrate the copyright cases, 
as did the gentleman from the U.S. PTO When you look at the copyright 
cases, most of them are fairly clear issues of copyrightability. An example 
is the leading case Mazer v. Stein, where you had a statue, a sculpted human 
figure. Of course, that is a fairly easy case now, we say. The issue in Mazer 
was whether you lose protection once you put that copyright subject matter 
into mass production and treat it as an article of utility. At least I think the 
Mazer case stands above all for the principle that if you take something that 
is a work of sculpture within the meaning of the copyright law, the fact that 
it can be mass produced, or the fact that it is made part of an article of util-
ity, does not destroy its protection. 
If you take the case of the Esquire outdoor light, you have a fairly sim-
ple structure that is essentially to house the bulb of the utilitarian object. 
The housing feature is, of course, part of the utilitarian shape. You would 
not just mount, or at least ordinarily not mount an outdoor light without 
some type of housing to protect it, as a part of the basic shape of the utilitar-
ian object. There is nothing separate. 
Ms. Schrader (responding to a question regarding the Copyright 
Office's meaning of ornamentation): Well, as to ornamentation, there is no 
question modern designers use ornamentation, and they have separable 
artistic features. They can get registration for those separable artistic fea-
tures. If I am not mistaken, there is little ornamentation in modern design. 
If I am wrong about that, then to the extent there is ornamentation, certainly 
it can be registered. 
Your point about other subject matter. A book, I should say more pre-
cisely a literary work, is not an article of utility. That is the whole point. 
We are here talking only about the question of the extent to which designs 
applied to articles of utility can be given copyright protection. Whether 
they should be given what is essentially a minimum of seventy-five years of 
protection. Whether they should be protected both with respect to conscious 
and unconscious infringement. That the infringement can be found with 
respect to retailers who sell the object without having any idea that it is an 
infringing object. These are the basic principles of copyright. 
I return to the point that a literary work is not an article of utility, and 
therefore even those that are sometimes referred to as useful works, are not 
strictly within the meaning of the law. They, in general, give information. 
Maps have always had utility, they give information, but they are not strictly 
speaking utilitarian objects. 
Question: I would be interested in asking Mr. Ansher if he would ver-
balize as to how he applies the section 103 test [35 U.S.c. § 103]. What 
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process do you go through in your analysis of whether or not you are going 
to reject it or allow it? 
Mr. Ansher: The standard one normally uses, without getting too 
legalistic, is one where you have. to find a reference that substantially 
teaches the general, overall, appearance of the design being applied for. 
Normally, the reference would disclose all the essential features of that par-
ticular design. The examiner would reject it with the one reference, because 
the differences between that design applied for and the reference is such that 
someone with ordinary skill in that art (your fictitious ordinary, competent 
worker or designer in that art with the patent examiner playing that role) 
would find them obvious changes. If the differences are such that they are 
very minor, they have very little or no visual impact on the overall design, 
and the claim would be rejected. 
If a combination of references is needed, you would have to find a sin-
gle reference that is essentially the same as the claimed design, and the dif-
ferences would have to be shown with a secondary reference, or references. 
The teaching reference would have to show that to put these secondary expe-
dients together, in such a manner as to result in what was being planned 
would be obvious to that person skilled in the art. For example, if you had a 
tape recorder, where you found a reference that was strikingly similar, in 
overall appearance, to the claimed design, you would start out by saying 
that the claim is rejected as unobvious over the basic reference A, being 
strikingly the same as applicant's design. To further modify that basic refer-
ence by providing a conventional knob, as taught by the secondary reference 
B, and further arrange them in the manner taught by reference C, would be 
obvious to one skilled in the art. The differences were shown to be old and 
well-known design expedients in the art. To combine these features 
together in this manner would be an obvious modification to one with the 
ordinary skill in the art. 
Question: Does the U.S. PTO examine for functionality? 
Mr. Ansher: Yes, if the inherent function of that particular design is 
based primarily on functional considerations. In other words, it is inherent 
in the particular design that it have that specific configuration. It is strictly 
functional. Then we reject it on lack of ornamentality under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 171. 
Mr. Pravel (responding to a question concerning whether the pending 
legislation has a simpler test than the design patent law): I think we have 
been trying to answer that question. Is there any way to avoid the obvious-
ness issue that is fundamentally involved in design patent law? I suppose the 
answer is the proposed legislation does remove that issue in its complexity. 
484 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
It has a slight. test, so it cannot be exactly the same as the prior art 
involved. I think that the proposed legislation does do that. For me, that is 
one advantage of it,. in terms of the ordinary designers. 
Comment from a designer in the audience: I do not have any solu-
tion. I think one of the reasons I do not have a solution, and neither do you 
really, is that I think so much differently from you. Designers think differ-
ently from lawyers, by necessity. One of the comments I said earlier was 
designers are visual people, and visual people think visually. It is the way 
you folks talk about design, that it is a foreign language to me, because I see 
so many things. I know what is involved. You people, rightly so, have to 
put it into words and that is where the problem lies. I do not have any solu-
tion. 
Mr. Saidman: I want to thank the panel. I for one hope this confer-
ence will be remembered as the first of many such annual events. I think it 
puts industrial design on a pedestal where it belongs. It focuses on the 
importance and the need for adequately protecting the creators of these 
unique intellectual properties. I think we, therefore, need to acknowledge 
the vision, commitment, the plain hard work that Professor Fryer and his 
staff have' made in putting this wonderful program together. 
Professor Fryer: Thank you Perry. I think you have done a marvel-
ous job, as did all the other moderators. I do not know how to thank you all 
adequately. 
Industrial designers are such strong individuals who independently 
carve out their own domain. They have made their presentations here very 
effectively. 
On behalf of the University of Baltimore, and other sponsoring organi-
zations, I thank you for coming to this conference. It has been a pleasure 
having you here. I hope, as Perry said, that this is really the beginning of a 
dialogue. So we are talking to each other, the lawyers, industrial designers, 
and government people. I felt a certain empathy coming across the table 
between designers and others. There is a better understanding of each 
other. 
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MICKEY MOUSE DESIGN PATENT 
U.S. Patent Oct. 24, 1978 Des. 250,023 
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MICKEY MOUSE UTILITY PATENT 
U.s. Patent May 2,1978 4,087,650 
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